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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff Jeannette Osguthorpe in her Brief filed February 
2, 1993 has continued an effective strategy which has been used 
throughout all of the legal proceedings in this case, i.e., 
inflame the court with emotional arguments so that the law will 
be cast aside. Plaintiff's addendum is full of irrelevant 
information which is there for the sole purpose to obtain a 
sympathetic response from this Court. Witness, for example, the 
police report at Appendix A19-24, the alleged transcript of 
conversation between Jerry and Jeannette Osguthorpe, Appendix 
A69-70, and the picture of the Osguthorpe house, Appendix A71. 
This effort would not be complete without the traditional citing 
of the trial testimony of Mr. Lynn Turnbow, "a neighbor of the 
parties" contained on page 31 of Plaintiff's Brief. Of course, 
as is normal, Plaintiff fails to mention that this "neighbor" is 
the former husband of Defendant's wife Gwenda, and is the present 
boyfriend of the plaintiff. 
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It is sincerely hoped that this Court will be able to rise 
above the emotionalism of the "deadbeat dad" allegation and 
examine this case in the academic and legal context it deserves. 
In the context of a legal analysis, therefore, a review of 
Plaintiff's Brief shows that she has been unable to refute the 
contentions made by Defendant in his opening Brief. She has 
attempted to confuse and misconstrue some of the events which 
occurred during this convoluted proceeding in an effort to avoid 
the pure and simple legal consequences of this case. Defendant 
will therefore review the original arguments he made in his 
opening Brief in light of the response now filed by Plaintiff. 
POINT I 
THE JANUARY AND MAY ORDERS OF THE LOWER 
COURT CONSTITUTE BOTH CRIMINAL AND 
CIVIL CONTEMPT. 
In Defendant's opening Brief he explained in great detail 
the distinctions between criminal and civil contempt. 
(Appellant's opening Brief at 26-34). The language in both the 
January and June Orders clearly showed both criminal and civil 
contempt was being imposed. The thirty-day requirement of 
incarceration in both orders constituted criminal contempt. 
Likewise, the $200 fine also complied with Section 78-32-10. 
Defendant in his opening Brief contended that the January 
hearing for purposes of this appeal is irrelevant. (Appellant's 
Brief at 42). The arguments advanced by Plaintiff substantiate 
this contention. As correctly noted by Plaintiff, no appeal was 
taken by Defendant from the January Order. (Appellant's Brief at 
12, 15-16). The reason that no appeal was taken was simply that 
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Dr. Osguthorpe, by borrowing money with his new wife, was able to 
come up with the lump sum amount of $5,000 to cancel his pending 
incarceration. 
Dr. Osguthorpe was able to successfully make his payments 
for a short time after the January hearing but then again fell 
into arrears. By then, of course, the thirty-day appeal time had 
expired and no appeal could be taken. This principle is even 
more dramatically illustrated had there been, for example, a year 
between the first order of contempt and the second. Obviously, a 
defendant who is incarcerated a year later from the first hearing 
cannot be said to have waived his appellate rights simply because 
he did not appeal from the first hearing even though he was only 
incarcerated pursuant to the second hearing and order. Quite 
simply, each order of contempt in a divorce proceeding must stand 
by itself in both procedure and evidence in order to justify 
contempt. Litigants cannot cite testimony in the original 
divorce proceeding or in prior contempt hearings in order to 
establish the necessary elements and procedure that must be 
present before incarceration can be imposed. 
For purposes of this appeal, therefore, Defendant will 
readily agree with the plaintiff that the January 24 hearing is 
non-appealable and will focus solely upon the May hearing and the 
June order. Understandably, while Plaintiff maintains that the 
January hearing is not properly before this Court she relies 
solely upon it for the evidentiary basis of contempt and the 
procedural events which occurred. This double speak must be 
removed from the issues actually being litigated in this appeal. 
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The Court during the May hearing "sustained its previous 
January Order" and ordered Defendant to be incarcerated in the 
Salt Lake County jail for a period of thirty days together with 
any additional time until he complied with the delinquent support 
obligation. Plaintiff maintains that Defendant's assertion that 
this was a criminal contempt proceeding is erroneous. She 
states, "Both the January and June Orders were remedial in nature 
because they provided Dr. Osguthorpe with a way of avoiding the 
jail sentence and contempt citation by simply making the child 
support payments required by the Court." (Respondent's Brief at 
21) . 
The argument made by Plaintiff is the same one referred to 
in Defendant's opening Brief where judges and lawyers believe 
that the stay of a sentence in order to allow a defendant to 
raise money prior to incarceration constitutes a "purge" thereby 
making the sentence civil and not criminal. (Appellant's Brief 
at 28-29). This contention of Plaintiff is simply not correct. 
The June 19, 1992 Order states, "If the $3,050 is not paid by 
June 24, 1992 at 12:00 noon, a bench warrant shall issue, unless 
the defendant submits himself to the Salt Lake County Jail for 
incarceration." As happened in this case Defendant served his 
entire thirty-day sentence when he was unable to obtain the 
necessary funds prior to the date of the ordered incarceration. 
Moreover, after the thirty days had expired he would have 
continued to serve indefinitely on the civil contempt order until 
the amount had been paid. The "purge" ability only applied to 
the sentence beyond the initial thirty days. The thirty-day 
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provision cannot be "purged"• It is a criminal sentence for past 
actions of contempt. 
It is the obligation of this Court to correct the 
misapplication of criminal contempt which occurs daily in divorce 
proceedings. Merely staying a sentence prior to incarceration 
does not convert a criminal sentence of a fixed number of days 
into a civil sentence. The "purge" must be allowed to occur 
while the defendant is incarcerated and not prior to the 
incarceration! Because of this misapplication of contempt 
numerous defendants each day are being sentenced to jail 
sentences without being afforded the criminal procedural rights 
they are entitled to under the state and federal Constitution. 
If judges such as Judge Wilkinson are going to use the 
thirty-day sentencing provision of Section 78-32-10, U.C.A., then 
they had better be prepared for the criminal ramifications that 
that section imposes. The flagrant violation of this principle 
daily violates the mandate of the Utah Supreme Court in Von Hake 
v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1168 (Utah 1988), where the Court 
stated, "A contempt order is criminal if its purpose is to 
vindicate the court's authority, as by punishing an individual 
for disobeying an order, even if the order arises from civil 
proceedings. 
For the preceding reasons, therefore, the analysis of the 
May Order as constituting both criminal and civil contempt has 
not been refuted by the plaintiff and is a legally correct 
analysis for purposes of this appeal. 
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POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED PROCEDURAL RIGHTS 
DURING THE PROCEEDING OF CRIMINAL 
CONTEMPT. 
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant was not denied procedural 
rights during either the January or May hearing. (Appellee's 
Brief at 13-14, 16, 23). These contentions are without merit. 
This Court in a recent December 1992 opinion stated the 
following concerning indirect criminal contempt:: 
Due process requires a person charged with indirect 
criminal contempt "to be advised of the nature of the 
action against him [or her], have assistance of counsel, 
if requested, have the right to confront witness, and 
have the right to offer testimony on his [or her] behalf. 
Von Hake, 759 P.2d at 1170 (quoting Burgers v. 
Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1982); State v. 
Long, 204 Utah Adv. Rpt. 18 (Utah App., Dec. 16, 1992). 
In the Long case initial hearings were held as to the reason 
why Mr. Long's client did not report to the Salt Lake County 
Jail. When it was determined that this failure to report was due 
allegedly from Mr. Long's advice to his client, the Court 
recessed the proceedings and required a new hearing specifically 
as to the issue of Mr. Long's criminal contempt. In other words, 
just like any other criminal offense, an accused defendant is 
entitled to a separate trial with its criminal procedural 
protections. 
In the instant case, however, as in literally hundreds of 
cases each year in the district courts, a father-defendant is 
brought to court on a civil order to show cause in the divorce 
proceeding which seeks numerous claims of relief such as back 
child support, back alimony, attorneys' fees, visitation awards, 
-6-
property awards, etc. All of these claims for relief are civil. 
No notice of criminal contempt is ever given. This same lack of 
notice occurred here also. In the instant case "Plaintiff's 
Verified Motion for Judgment, Contempt Order, Sanctions and Other 
Relief" filed on September 25, 1991 requested a finding that 
Defendant be held in contempt of court. It did not apprise 
Defendant that criminal contempt of court was being sought. 
(Appellee's Brief, Appendix A9-14). 
When the actual hearing occurred in January a full day of 
evidence was offered as to the numerous claims advanced by the 
plaintiff. As is apparentd from the transcript of that 
proceeding, no effort was ever made to conform this hearing to a 
criminal case. Defendant was never advised by the court that 
this was a criminal action against him, that he had the right to 
assistance of counsel if he was unable to afford counsel, that he 
had the right to confront witnesses, remain silent or to offer 
testimony in his behalf. The entire proceeding was in the nature 
of a civil divorce trial. 
It was not until the court made its ruling from the bench 
that the matter of criminal contempt was raised. The court 
stated in the January 7, 1992 hearing, "The Court would order, 
pursuant to Section 78-32-10—and of course I've indicated he has 
been found in contempt—that he be fined $200, and that he be 
ordered to spend thirty days in the Salt Lake County Jail." 
(Appellant's Appendix at 53). 
This type of proceeding which is common in Utah would be 
analogous to a situation where a grocery store files a civil 
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damages action against an employeefor embezzlement and at the 
conclusion of the trial the court orders the pajrment of damages 
to the store and the defendant to be incarcerated for criminal 
embezzlement. Obviously, such a result would never occur in any 
other context than divorce proceedings which are already muddled 
to the point of being almost incomprehensible. 
The procedural violations concerning the May hearing were 
even more flagrant. Again, the "Plaintiff's Verified Motion for 
Judgment, Attorneys' Fees and Immediate Imposition of Jail 
Sentence" did not give Defendant proper notice of a criminal 
contempt of court proceeding—a jail sentence can also be for 
civil contempt. (Appellant's Brief at A42-45). The "Notice of 
Hearing" likewise did not inform Defendant of the criminal nature 
of the proceeding. (Appellant's Brief at A47). 
During the May proceeding the Court never advised Defendant 
of the criminal nature of the action against him, that he had the 
right of assistance of counsel or that counsel would be appointed 
for him if he could not afford it, that he had the right to 
confront witnesses or that he had the right to offer testimony on 
his behalf. No witnesses were sworn and no evidence was taken in 
this proceeding with the exception of the proffer by Defendant of 
his current income tax forms. At the conclusion of the hearing 
Dr. Osguthorpe stated to the judge "I didn't know today that I 
could call witnesses, Your Honor. I thought this was just a 
motion to show cause. I'm not familiar—that familiar with the 
court system." (R. 645). 
Defendant like numerous other litigants in the divorce 
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system before the Utah courts was "ordered to show cause" why 
he should not be held in contempt of court. As noted by the 
Illinois Appellate Court in In Re Marriage of Bettsy 558 
N.E.2d 404, 425 (111. App. 1990) if a defendant accused of 
criminal contempt has a constitutional right not to testify, he 
cannot be required to "show cause" since this violates his right 
to remain silent. In addition, in a criminal contempt the burden 
is on the petitioner to prove the charges in the petition beyond 
a reasonable doubt and not upon the defendant to prove his 
innocence. 
There is no other judicial situation where incarceration 
occurs because of the actions of a private attorney rather than a 
city or state prosecutor. If criminal contempt is to be a tool 
in divorce proceedings then the procedures applicable to any 
criminal defendant must be followed to the highest degree. In 
the instant case, for example, Defendant served thirty days in 
the Salt Lake County Jail and shared his cell with traditional 
criminal defendants who were afforded all of the constitutional 
rights that criminal defendants are entitled to receive. His 
incarceration, however, was no less painful than those of his 
cellmates and he is certainly entitled to the same protections 
that even the most heinous criminal defendant receives under our 
federal and state constitutional systems. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED AS TO CIVIL CONTEMPT 
BY FAILING TO INQUIRE IF DEFENDANT WAS 
INDIGENT AND WHETHER COUNSEL NEEDED TO BE 
APPOINTED. 
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Plaintiff has made no attempt to refute the contention of 
Defendant that civil contempt defendants also require at least 
the right to counsel. Here, Defendant would still be 
incarcerated today under the Court's order of civil contempt if 
his father had not paid the money owing to the plaintiff. 
It is completely against logic and justice to require full 
constitutional protections to a father being held in criminal 
contempt with a maximum of thirty days but to require no 
protections to a father who may be held in jail for months or 
even years for failure to pay an obligation he claims he cannot 
pay. 
The authorities cited by Defendant in his opening Brief are 
convincing. While this is a question of first impression in the 
State of Utah, there is no reason not to apply the decisions of 
these well-respected courts in requiring the assistance of 
counsel where civil contempt is being imposed. Again, in the 
instant case, the defendant's incarceration in the Salt Lake 
County Jail was just as traumatic to him during the one day of 
civil contempt as any other person who is incarcerated as a 
criminal defendant. It is the loss of liberty and freedom which 
is the issue and not the proceeding from which this loss occurs. 
POINT IV 
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS REQUIRED FOR 
CIVIL OR CRIMINAL CONTEMPT AND, IN 
ADDITION, THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER 
COURT ARE LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT TO 
IMPOSE CONTEMPT. 
Defendant in attempting to justify the contempt orders 
specifically relies upon the January 7 proceeding. (Appellee's 
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Brief at 18-19). As noted earlier, however, Defendant was not 
incarcerated as a result of the January hearing but specifically 
as a result of the May hearing. Even if it is assumed arguendo 
that the evidence in the January hearing was sufficient to have 
imposed the contempt of court of the January 24 Order, such fact 
does not help the appellee in this case. 
It is the obligation of the moving party to prove the 
required evidentiary basis by the criminal standard of beyond a 
reasonable doubt or the civil standard of clear and convincing 
evidence each time a separate contempt is being sought. For 
example, if Defendant had a high paying job in January but lost 
it in February and was therefore unable to make any continuing 
payments, the evidence taken in the January hearing could not be 
used as a basis for a subsequent hearing in December. Moreover, 
it is not sufficient for a litigant in a divorce proceeding to 
merely show that money is owed by the other party. While this 
will result in a money judgment being levied against the other 
party, it is legally insufficient to impose incarceration. The 
moving party must prove that the defendant has the ability to 
comply with the court's order and has willfully refused to do so. 
In the instant case, the May hearing is clearly procedurally 
as well as substantively inadequate to have imposed jail 
incarceration. No testimony under oath was taken by the court at 
all. No proffers of testimony were made. All that occurred was 
the dialogue among the judge, defendant and plaintiff's attorney. 
The only evidence offered was by Defendant of his current tax 
return which substantiated his claims that he was unable to meet 
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these obligations. 
Since there was no evidence taken there were no findings 
entered. As noted in Defendant's opening Brief, such findings 
are legally required before contempt of court can be imposed. 
Thus, Plaintiff's effort to piggyback the May hearing upon the 
findings of the January hearing is constitutionally defective 
and cannot be allowed to stand. 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT'S INCARCERATION FOR THIRTY 
DAYS IN THE SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL 
VIOLATED ARTICLE I SECTION 16 OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION WHICH PROVIDES THERE 
SHALL BE NO IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT. 
Plaintiff has made no attempt to address the constitutional 
issue raised by Defendant. Instead, she has generaly relied upon 
her old tactic of trying to inflame this Court as to emotional 
issues of nonsupport. In addition, many of her citations for 
this emotional impact relate to testimony or events many years 
prior to the May hearing. The standard of contempt of court as 
well as this state constitutional provision requires evidence of 
a present ability to pay and a present defiance of the court's 
order. Whatever happened in the past is irrelevant in 
determining imprisonment for debt. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF 
ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED AS A RESULT OF THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT EXTRAORDINARY WRIT ACTION 
AND THE FEDERAL COURT HABEAS CORPUS ACTION. 
Plaintiff makes the interesting argument that because no 
separate notice of appeal was taken from the order of attorneys' 
fees issued in accordance with this Court's remand, that 
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Defendant has waived any right to now complain. (Appellee's 
Brief at 12; 24-25). This argument is also without merit. 
Defendant properly appealed the June 19, 1992 order of 
contempt. At that time all matters relating to the contempt were 
removed from the lower court and placed in the jurisdiction of 
this Court. On July 16, 1992 this Court issued an order "that 
the case is temporarily remanded to the trial court for 
determination and entry of an award of appellee's costs and 
attorneys' fees reasonably incurred in opposing the motion for 
stay." 
As soon as this hearing had been held the case was sent back 
to this Court for disposition. In effect, this Court appointed 
the lower court as a master to assist in the appellate decision. 
As such, therefore, Defendant is entitled to properly complain 
about the proceedings below which are legitimately connected to 
the original notice of appeal filed in this case. 
The contention of Plaintiff would require Defendant to pay a 
separate filing fee, file a separate docketing statement and file 
briefs months or years behind the main action which is the 
subject matter of the lawsuit. Moreover, the court's decision as 
to attorneys' fees cannot be deemed a final order but is only an 
interlocutory order of the contempt proceeding. 
Defendant submits, therefore, that this matter of attorneys' 
fees is properly before the court and that the lower court 
exceeded its limited jurisdiction granted by this Court in 
awarding attorneys' fees incurred in the Supreme Court and 
Federal District Court actions. In any event, the district court 
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had no power to make the award when neither Court ordered such 
fees be assessed. 
Assuming that this Court finds that Defendant's 
incarceration was improper and that the contempt of court order 
was illegal then Defendant respectfully submits that any award of 
attorneys' fees incurred as a result of attempting to stay that 
order should also be reversed since Defendant was justified in 
seeking the original stay in spite of this Court's preliminary 
decision to the contrary. 
POINT VII 
PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED HER 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS INCURRED IN 
CONNECTION WITH THIS APPEAL. 
In a final effort to arouse sympathy and emotion on her 
behalf Plaintiff's attorney cites selected portions of the record 
(some many years old) to further substantiate the "deadbeat dad" 
claim made throughout these proceedings. This Court should keep 
in mind, however, that attorneys' fees have already been awarded 
to the plaintiff for all of the proceedings from which this 
testimony was taken. The sole question before this Court is 
whether in this appeal Plaintiff is entitled to additional 
attorneys' fees. 
The answer to this question is simple. If Defendant 
prevails in his claim that he was wrongfully incarcerated then he 
will be the victor in the appeal and Plaintiff is not entitled to 
attorneys' fee regardless of all of the past wrongs she may claim 
have occurred during these four-year proceedings. If, on the 
other hand, Defendant loses this appeal, then this Court may 
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properly consider awarding her appropriate fees directed solely 
to the issues of the appeal upon a finding that she is unable to 
pay her own attorneys' fees. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court, as an appellate court, is obligated to examine 
cases much more carefully than in the war zone of the district 
courts. For example, what may be an effective trial tactic to 
obtain a favorable verdict in an emotional personal injury case 
may not be found legaly proper when viewed in the sanctity of the 
appellate court conference room. Likewise, the smoke and mirror 
arguments and emotional pleas which occur daily in the district 
courts as to divorce proceedings must be discarded completely so 
that a correct legal analysis can be made. 
Defendant contends that when the emotional pleas of 
Plaintiff are eliminated from this appeal, the record is crystal 
clear that the following has occurred: (1) Defendant was not 
given proper procedural notice of his rights as to the criminal 
contempt conviction he received; (2) the stay of execution of a 
criminal contempt order does not amount to a "purging" which 
converts such order to a civil contempt as is erroneously 
believed by most judges and lawyers in Utah; (3) before a 
defendant can be physically incarcerated as to criminal contempt 
there must be an evidentiary hearing upon which the moving party 
proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant willfully 
failed to comply with the court's order; (4) before incarceration 
can occur the lower court must specifically make findings as to 
this willfulness; (5) since the consequences of civil contempt 
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are even more severe than criminal contempt defendants are 
entitled to certain elementary rights such as the right to 
counsel to prevent unjustified incarcerations; (6) all of the 
above principles are applicable to every defendant in a divorce 
proceeding no matter how far behind he is in his child support 
payments and no matter how bad a person he is claimed to be by 
the former spouse* 
This case not only affects the rights of Dr. Osguthorpe but 
concerns the procedures utilized daily in the State of Utah as to 
hundreds of other defendants. It is hoped that this Court will 
recognize the legal ramifications of this decision and will make 
the careful legal analysis required to overcome the emotional 
fluff permeating the record. 
DATED this 18th day of February, 1993. 
Craig S. CqS&k 
Attorney for Appellant 
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